Exchange rate regime choice has evolved considerably in the past 100 years. At the beginning of the twentieth century the choice was obvious --join the gold standard, all the advanced countries have done it. Floating exchange rates and fiat money are only for profligate countries. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the choice is also becoming more obvious --go to floating exchange rates, all the advanced countries have done it. Moreover in both eras, the emerging markets of the day tried to emulate the advanced countries but in many cases had great difficulties in doing so. What happened in the past century to lead to this tour de force?
Introduction
Exchange rate regime choice has evolved considerably in the past 100 years. At the beginning of the twentieth century the choice was obvious --join the gold standard, all the advanced countries have done it. Floating exchange rates and fiat money are only for profligate countries. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the choice is also becoming more obvious --go to floating exchange rates, all the advanced countries have done it.
2 Moreover in both eras, the emerging markets of the day tried to emulate the advanced countries but in many cases had great difficulties in doing so (Bordo and Flandreau 2003) . What happened in the past century to lead to this tour de force?
Actually of course, the choice today is much more complicated than I have just alluded to. Indeed rather than two options there are many more ranging from pure floats through many intermediate arrangements to hard pegs like currency boards, dollarization and currency unions.
In this paper I will look at the issue from the perspective of both the advanced countries, who generally have a choice and the emergers who have less of one and who often emulate what the advanced countries have done. Section 2 surveys some of the 1 For helpful comments on an earlier draft we thank Nasser Saidi and Lars Jonung. For able research assistance we thank Sonal Dhingra. 2 In the pre 1914 period, there were also a number of monetary unions and currency boards. Two types of monetary unions prevailed: international unions such as the Latin monetary union and the Scandinavian monetary union, which basically involved arrangements for standardizing gold and silver coins and the clearing of payments; and national monetary unions, such as the United States, Germany and Italy, which involved the complete economic and political integration of the member states with a common currency (Bordo and Jonung 2000) . Currency boards which originated in this period were run by the British and the French in a number of their colonies. (Schwartz 1992) .
theoretical issues involved beginning with a taxonomy of regimes. We first discuss the Mundell Fleming criterion and its two offshoots: the trilemma and optimum currency area. We then consider the approaches focusing on credibility and a nominal anchor.
Finally we look at the recent bipolar view which emphasizes credibility and financial development. Section 3 examines the empirical evidence on the delineation of regimes and their macro performance. Section 4 provides a brief history of monetary regimes.
Section 5 concludes with some policy issues.
Theoretical Issues from an Historical Perspective
The menu of exchange rate regimes has evolved over the past century pari pasu with developments in theory. Below I survey some of the principal developments with an historical perspective. Before we do this I present a modern day taxonomy of exchange rate arrangements in Table 1 . Table 1 contains a list of 9 arrangements prevalent today. They are arranged top to bottom by the degree of fixity. Modern fixed arrangements include: truly fixed arrangements like the recent CFA franc zone; currency boards in which the monetary authority holds 100 % reserves in foreign currency against the monetary base, the money supply expands or contracts automatically with the state of the balance of payments and there is no role for discretionary monetary policy including a lender of last resort; dollarization which goes one step forward and eliminates the national currency completely; and currency unions in which the members adopt the same currency.
Modern Exchange Rate Arrangements
Intermediate arrangements run the continuum from: an adjustable peg under which countries can periodically realign their pegs; to crawling pegs in which the peg is regularly reset in a series of devaluations; to a basket peg where the exchange rate is fixed in terms of a weighted basket of foreign currencies; to target zones or bands where the authorities intervene when the exchange rate hits pre announced margins on either side of a central parity.
Floating exchange rates are divided into: free floats where the authorities do not intervene and allow the exchange rate to be determined by market forces; and managed floats where intervention is done to lean against the wind.
The demarcating line between fixed and intermediate arrangements is if the policy to fix is an institutional commitment. The line between intermediate and floating is if
there is an explicit target zone around which the authority intervenes (Frankel 2002) . Frankel (1999) .
Theoretical Perspectives
The traditional view on the choice of the exchange rate regime a century ago was very simple. It was between specie standards and fixed exchange rates on the one hand, and fiat money and floating on the other. The prevalent view was that adherence to a specie standard meant adherence to sound money i.e. predictable policies that maintained stable price levels (as well as fiscal probity i.e. balanced budgets) and avoiding the transactions costs of exchanging different currencies into each other. By 1900, most nations had switched away from silver and bimetallic standards and adhered to the gold standard. Fiat money and floating was considered to be a radical departure from fiscal and monetary stability and was only to be tolerated in the event of temporary emergencies such as wars or financial crises. Countries which followed fiat money and permanently floated such as Austria-Hungary, and Spain were viewed with disfavor.
In the interwar period, the return to the gold standard was short-lived, ending with the Great Depression. The return to the gold standard was preceded by widespread floating as was the period following it. The contemporary perspective on the experience with floating in the interwar was that it was associated with destabilizing speculation and beggar thy neighbor devaluations (Nurkse 1944) . This perception lay at the root of the creation of the Bretton Woods adjustable peg in 1944. The currency arrangements that many countries signed onto after Bretton Woods combined pegged exchange rates with parities fixed in terms of dollars, the dollar pegged to gold, narrow bands of 2 ½ percent around parity and the right to change parity in the event of a fundamental misalignment.
It was supposed to combine the advantages of the gold standard (sound money) with those of floating (flexibility and independence).
The difficulties that member nations had in finding a parity consistent with balance of payments equilibrium and the currency crises that attended the realignments of parities in the early years of the Bretton Woods system (Bordo 1993) , set the stage for the perennial debate between fixed versus flexible exchange rates. Milton Friedman (1953) An optimal currency area (OCA) is defined as "a region for which it is optimal to have a single currency and a single monetary policy" (Frankel 1999 p. 11) . The concept has been used both as setting the criteria for establishing a monetary union with perfectly rigid exchange rates between the members with a common monetary policy, and the case for fixed versus floating. The criteria posed by Mundell (1961) , Kenen (1969) and McKinnon (1963) for whether a region such as Europe was an OCA involved the symmetry of shocks in the member states, the degree of openness, the degree of labor mobility and the ability to make fiscal transfers.
In simplest terms, based on OCA theory, the advantages of fixed exchange rates increases with the degree of integration. Recent approaches suggest that the OCA criteria also work in an ex post sense --that joining a currency union by promoting trade and integration increases the correlation of shocks (Frankel and Rose 2002) .
Credibility and Exchange Rate Regime Choice
A different set of criteria for exchange rate regime choice than that based on the benefits of integration versus the benefits of monetary independence, is based on the concept of a nominal anchor. In an environment of high inflation, as was the case in most countries in the 1970s and 1980s, pegging to the currency of a country with low inflation was viewed as a precommitment mechanism to anchor inflationary expectations.
This argument was based on the theory developed by Barro and Gordon (1983) who discuss the case of a central bank using discretionary monetary policy to generate surprise inflation in order to reduce unemployment. They demonstrate that with rational expectations the outcome will be higher inflation but unchanged employment because the inflationary consequences of the central bank's actions will be incorporated in workers' wage demands. The only way to prevent such time inconsistent behavior is by instituting a precommitment mechanism or a monetary rule.
In an open economy a pegged exchange rate may promote such a precommitment device, at least as long as the political costs of breaking the peg are sufficiently large.
This argument was used extensively in the 1980s to make the case for the ERM in Europe, and in the 1990s for currency boards and other hard pegs in transition and emerging countries.
Domestic Nominal Anchors
The case for floating has also been buttressed by the theoretical work on credibility and time consistency. Designing a set of domestic institutions that will produce low inflation and long-run expectations of low inflation is consistent with the monetary independence associated with floating rates. The creation of independent central banks (independent from financing fiscal deficits) and establishing low inflation targeting in a number of advanced countries represents a domestic precommitment strategy (Svensson (2002) ).
Emerging Market Perspectives
The recent spate of emerging market crises in the 1990's has led to attention to the plight of these countries who have opened up their financial markets. Most of the countries hit by crises had pegged exchange rates. According to the trilemma view, the crises were a signal that open capital markets, monetary independence and pegs were incompatible as had been the case with the advanced countries in Bretton Woods and the ERM in 1992. Consequently many observers have put forward the bipolar view --that the only options for these countries are super hard pegs or floating.
Yet the emergers face special problems which make this simple dichotomy a bit more difficult than is posed. First in the case of hard pegs such as currency boards (or dollarization), currency crises are ruled out (to the extent the currency board is followed) but banking crises are still possible and without a monetary authority they cannot be contained (Chang and Velasco 2001) . Related to the inability to act as Lender of Last
Resort is the inability to have the monetary policy flexibility to offset external real shocks. Moreover establishing a currency board or going the next step and dollarizing works best if the currency picked for the peg is of a country that has extensive trade with the emerger and has a history of monetary stability.
Second is the so called problem of 'Original Sin' (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999) . Because many emerging countries are financially underdeveloped and they may have had a history of high inflation and fiscal laxity, they are not able to either borrow in terms of their own currencies long-term or to borrow externally except in terms of foreign currencies such as the dollar. This according to Eichengreen and Hausmann, exposes them to the serious problems of both maturity and currency mismatches. In the face of a currency crisis a devaluation can lead to serious balance sheet problems, widespread bankruptcies and debt defaults. This was the case in East Asia in the 1990's and also when Argentina exited from its currency board in 2001. The 'Original Sin' creates problems for emergers who float and even those who adopt hard pegs.
A third problem for emergers that float is that devaluations may have no effect on the real economy in the face of widespread indexation or a history of high inflation. Thus there may be very high pass through from the exchange rate to the price level or in the case of original sin, as mentioned above, devaluing may actually be contractionary. 
Measurement and Performance
In making the correct exchange rate regime choice it is very important to have some empirical evidence on economic performance. An extensive literature has developed to answer the question which regime performs best. Before discussing what the evidence seems to say however, we need to consider an important methodological question. How do we classify exchange rate regimes?
Two answers are given: either de jure or de facto. The former establishes a list of regimes like Table 1 and then classifies countries by what they say they do. This is the approach that has been taken by the IMF and authors like Ghosh et al (2003) . It is justified on the grounds that announcing a regime has important forward looking credibility effects.
The second approach by authors such as Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and LevyYeyati-Sturznegger (2001) starts with the premise that for various reasons including 'fear of floating' and lack of credibility, countries do not do exactly what they say they do.
This approach tries to correct for this problem by using observed behavior of the exchange rate, international reserves and other variables to infer a de facto classification scheme.
The most notable study using the de jure scheme is by Fischer (2001) Table 1 shows that in 1976 86 % of developing countries maintained pegged arrangements, by 1996 only 45 % had some kind of peg and 52 % had a flexible exchange rate arrangement.
The de facto camp doubts the meaning of these data because many peggers frequently have realignments (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995) referred to as "soft pegs" and many floaters are reluctant to float referred to as "hard floats" because they have 'fear of floating.' This is because they view devaluations as contractionary because of adverse balance sheet effects (Calvo and Reinhart 2002) . Levy-Yeyati and Sturznegger (2000) attempt to account for these problems by constructing a de facto classification scheme based on the volatility of exchange rates and international reserves. They use cluster analysis to classify countries into the three groups of pegged, intermediate and flexible.
Their evidence for the 1990's confirms the significant presence of both "soft pegs" and "hard floats." Indeed, they doubt the evidence on hollowing out --they find about equal representation in each of the three categories.
Finally, in a very recent paper, Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) (1914 -1945 Bretton Woods (1946 -1971 in turn divided into the pre convertible period (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) Also hard pegs do not appear to be a panacea against inflation. Finally growth performance is by far the best for the freely floaters, a result similar to LYS.
In sum, the de facto evidence on performance is markedly different from the de jure evidence from the IMF. The fact that both LYS and RR using very different methodologies associate floating with high growth and that floating is not associated with the high inflation seen in the de jure classification suggests that how regime classification is done has important implications for the issue of regime choice. 8 9 8 Ghosh et al (2002) using the de jure definitions find from regressions of inflation on exchange rate regime dummies and other variables such as money growth, openness, terms of trade shocks that the differences between pegged and floaters narrows considerably. For real per capita growth they cannot detect any significant differences across regimes. 9 Juhn and Mauro (2002) using both the de jure and LYS de facto classification schemes and a large panel data set from 1990 to the present, find that no robust empirical regularities can be found to explain exchange rate regime choice. Whereas Levy-Yeyati, Stuznegger and Regio (2002) using the LYS classification scheme and panel data (demarcated into industrial and emerging countries) from 1974 to the present, find that exchange rate regime choice for industrial countries is explained by OCA type variables, while for the emergers balance sheet effects and the capital account are important. 
History of Exchange Rate Regime Choice
Exchange rate regime choice has evolved considerably in the past century. Table   3 shows a very rough chronology of the exchange rate regimes the world has seen since 1880. They have expanded considerably from the simple choice between the gold standard and fiat to the 15 regimes demarcated by Reinhart and Rogoff. Yet the basic choice between fixed and flexible still remains at the heart of the matter. My approach in this section is not to repeat the history of international monetary regimes which is well covered by Eichengreen (1996) and Bordo and Schwartz (1999) but to focus on a comparison of monetary regimes in the two eras of financial The essence of the classical gold standard for the core countries was a credible commitment to maintain gold convertibility i.e. following the gold standard rule.
Adhering to gold convertibility can be viewed as a commitment mechanism to the pursuit of sound monetary and fiscal policies (Bordo and Kydland 1996) . The commitment by these countries to gold convertibility was credible based on their past performance. The rule followed was a contingent rule: adhere to gold parity except in the event of a well understood emergency such as a financial crisis or a war. Under such circumstances a temporary departure from parity was tolerated on the understanding that it would be restored once the emergency had passed. Because these countries demonstrated their willingness to follow such a rule e.g. the British experience in the Napoleonic war and the U.S in the Civil war, and to subsume domestic policy goals to the external constraint, they had earned the credibility to have a measure of short-term policy flexibility that enabled them to buffer transitory shocks. Indeed temporary departures from gold parity would be offset by stabilizing short term capital flows.
Moreover the gold points can be viewed as a modern credible "target zone" a la Krugman (1991) which allowed the monetary authorities some flexibility for example to conduct expansionary monetary policy to lower short-term interest rates and thus compensate for declining output. The decline in short-term interest rates would be offset by a rise in the exchange rate on the expectation that the parity would be restored.
Today, the advanced countries (with the principal exception of the European Union) have floating exchange rates. To a certain extent the current trend towards floating has some resemblance to the classical gold standard in which the fluctuation margins have been widened to give more flexibility. The key difference between then and now is that the nominal anchor --gold parity around which the target zone operated --has been jettisoned and a domestic fiat nominal anchor has been substituted in its place, which allows exchange rate flexibility without the constraint of a target zone. The two systems are similar in spirit because they are each based on credibility. They also had independent central banks, minimal regulation of the financial system and the absence of capital controls.
In this sense, the evolution from the gold standard to today's managed floating represents a major technical improvement. Today's regime has adopted the credibility or what Bordo and Schwartz (1999) call the "convertibility principle" of the classical gold standard without the high resource costs and the "vagaries" of the gold market which plagued the classical gold standard. Also, the development of deep and liquid foreign exchange and other financial markets have aided the smooth operation of a floating rate system.
A consequence of this analysis is that logically, the pre 1914 core countries that had developed strong money and financial markets and institutions before World War I ought to have floated --something which they did not. The possible reasons why the logic of the target zone was not pushed further include: the protection that gold gave to bond holders against inflation risk and the political constituency thus created; and the path dependency of gold as money.
Middle Years: 1914 -1972
What happened in the middle years of financial deglobalization between 1914 and 1973? According to the trilemma view of Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) , the gold standard with free capital mobility had to be jettisoned in the advanced countries in the face of growing demands by an expanding electorate and organized labor to stabilize the business cycle. More likely it was abandoned because of the shocks and imbalances caused by World War I.
The gold standard was reinstated as a gold exchange standard in 1925. Central banks supplemented their gold reserves with foreign exchange (sterling and dollar). The gold exchange standard collapsed in 1931. Its brief life is attributed to a number of fatal flaws in its design (see Bordo 1993) and to a decline in credibility reflecting the fact that consequent upon the growth of democracy monetary authorities had the domestic goal of full employment to satisfy as well as to maintain gold convertibility (Eichengreen 1992) The result was capital controls in the 1930's and the adjustable peg in the Bretton Woods era after World War II. In the late 1960s, the latter was blown apart, leading to the current floating regime. The demise of the Bretton Woods was precipitated by the pursuit of financial policies inconsistent with maintaining the pegged rate system by the key countries, especially the U. S., which had used expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to finance the Vietnam war; as well as by the pressure of international financial integration in spite of the capital controls (Bordo 1993) .
Core versus Periphery: History of the Periphery
The periphery countries faced a vastly different exchange rate experience from the core countries in the pre 1914 era of globalization as they have in the recent era. Pre 1914 in contrast to the core countries, many peripheral countries did not develop the fiscal and monetary institutions that allowed then to credibly follow the gold standard rule. Because they lacked credibility they were not buffered from shocks by the "target zone."
In an advanced country, a shock leading to a depreciating exchange rate could temporarily be offset by lowering interest rates so that output may recover. For the periphery, exchange rate depreciation could trigger capital flight and financial distress.
This could occur because the markets do not expect that the exchange rate will be restored by future corrective policies. It also could occur because a substantial amount of external debt is denominated in a foreign currency.
Because of this problem floating did not create much room for the periphery countries to conduct active monetary policies compared to the experience of the core countries. But going onto gold did not buy immediate credibility for them either as illustrated by the levels of short term interest rates in a number of typical members of the periphery. Figure 4a to 4e show that the weaker members of the gold club faced higher short term interest rates even when on gold than is consistent with their actual exchange rate record. This suggests some kind of "peso" problem. The high short-term rates faced by Chile, Greece, Portugal, Italy or Russia, during their more or less extended flirt with gold suggests that problems that the modern periphery has with pegging, as evidenced in the emerging financial crises of the 1990s, have nineteenth century precedents. The fact that even when on gold, these countries could face high short-term rates, might explain why some of them ended up floating. The modern "fear of floating" problem whereby countries which say they float do not, for the reasons mentioned above discussed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) Moreover adhering to the gold standard was not a perfect substitute for the gold clauses. Since the club of countries that could issue debt abroad denominated in their own currency was much narrower than the set of countries on the gold standard. Bordo and Flandreau (2003) The inability to assume debt in their own currency meant that having a large gold debt and experiencing an exchange rate crisis could have devastating consequences when a country embarked on a spending spree and public debt increased. The share of gold denominated debt increased in turn. This created an explosive mismatch.
The crises of the 1890s very much like those of the 1990s provided evidence of the mechanism at work. The crises started with Argentina where the expansion of the gold debt, accompanied by paper money issue, pushed the level of the debt burden to unsustainable heights. Public debt crises in Portugal and Greece (1892 and 1893) both resulted from the depreciation of the exchange rate that had brought these countries public debts to unsustainable levels.
The responses to these problems induced by high debts and financial vulnerability were also surprisingly modern. Some countries such as Spain and Portugal, continued to float but minimized their exposure by limiting their borrowings abroad. Some others such as Russia or Greece developed de facto currency boards. They accumulated gold reserves beyond what was statutorily necessary and in effect adopted gold cover ratios that were consistently above 100%. Yesterday like today there seems to have been a hollowing out as a response to financial crises.
Clearly, in view of the narrow list of countries that were able to float debts in their own currency, much of the emerging world was bound to face currency mismatches.
From this point of view, gold adherence became for those willing to protect themselves against international financial disturbances a second best solution. It is not that a gold standard immediately brought credibility. Rather it served as an insurance mechanism and in this sense fostered globalization. In other words the spread of the gold standard in the periphery may have been an endogenous response to the gold clauses: as soon as the price of this insurance decreased (as was the case during the gold inflation of 1897-1914), the gold standard expanded, as more and more countries found it less dangerous to borrow with gold clauses since the risk of being tipped off gold declined.
The interpretation of the seemingly opposite nature of global exchange rate regimes in the two big eras of globalization (fixed exchange rates back then, floating ones today) has put at the center of the picture the role of financial vulnerability and financial crises. To some extent, the Baring crises yesterday played a role similar to the crises of the late 1990s in reminding emerging floaters about the dangers of an impervious floating exchange rate. As a result while developed countries have always had the temptation and the ability to float (with floating restricted yesterday by path dependency and the difficulty of creating domestic institutions that could create a domestic nominal anchor) the periphery has always faced serious difficulties in floating, viewing the gold standard yesterday, and hard pegs today as a second best solution.
Bordo and Flandreau (2003) Evidence for the core countries that the classical gold standard operated as a target zone with the gold points serving as bands in which credible floating could occur and external shocks be buffered is a presage to the regime followed today. Today's floating is a product of financial maturity and the development of the technological and institutional structures and constraints that allow policy makers to follow stable money and fiscal policy without adhering to an external nominal anchor.
Thus the dynamics of the international monetary system and evolution of the exchange rate regime is driven by financial development and international financial integration. Financial crises such as those of the 1890s and 1990s are the defining moments that reveal the regime fault lines between advanced and emerging countries.
The evolution of the gold standard and the movement towards successful floating by 10 With the exception of small economies with considerable openness or close trading links to a large country who chose not to float and instead adhered to hard pegs e.g. Hong Kong.
advanced countries today required achieving financial maturity. The same will be required for the rest of the world. In the interim intermediate arrangements including
impediments to free capital movements will prevail. Financial crises as occurred in the 1890s and the 1990s will also continue to be an important part of the process of regime evolution as an ultimate structuring force.
Policy Implications
Which exchange rate arrangement is best? This survey historically agrees with Frankel (1999) who states that "no single currency regime in best for all countries and that even for a given country it may be that no single currency regime is best for all time." However the world is evolving towards a floating exchange rate regime which is the regime of the advanced countries which in many ways echoes the movement towards In reaction to that experience, many observers have made the case for bipolarity. Moreover the 'fear of floating' view has made the case that emergers should likely move toward hard pegs rather than floats. Yet both currency boards and dollarization have serious flaws, the principal of which is the absence of a monetary authority to as act as a lender of last resort or to offset external shocks (Larain and Velasco 2001) . Moreover currency unions which can overcome those problems need considerable political will to survive in the face of the shocks that inevitably come along (Bordo and Jonung 2000) .
Thus in the face of these considerations the case still can be made for intermediate 
